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Abstract
We examine strategic sophistication using eight two-person 3 × 3 one-shot games. 
To facilitate strategic thinking, we design a ‘structured’ environment where sub-
jects first assign subjective values to the payoff pairs and state their beliefs about 
their counterparts’ probable strategies, before selecting their own strategies in light 
of those deliberations. Our results show that a majority of strategy choices are 
inconsistent with the equilibrium prediction, and that only just over half of strat-
egy choices constitute best responses to subjects’ stated beliefs. Allowing for other-
regarding considerations increases best responding significantly, but the increase 
is rather small. We further compare patterns of strategies with those made in an 
‘unstructured’ environment in which subjects are not specifically directed to think 
strategically. Our data suggest that structuring the pre-decision deliberation process 
does not affect strategic sophistication.
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1 Introduction
The experimental game literature has produced a number of studies showing that 
a substantial proportion of individuals’ strategy choices neither correspond to 
equilibrium predictions, nor are best responses, as judged according to the belief-
weighted values of the available options, especially in environments where games 
are complex and learning opportunities are limited (e.g., see Camerer, 2003; 
Costa-Gomes & Weizsäcker, 2008; Danz et al., 2012; Hoffmann, 2014; Polonio & 
Coricelli, 2019; Sutter et al., 2013).
Various possibilities have been suggested to explain deviations from equilib-
rium behaviour, including subjects’ naivety, low engagement, or limited under-
standing of the strategic environment, especially when subjects are inexperienced 
and a game is presented for the first time. Some have suggested that there may be 
a lack of game-form recognition, i.e., a failure to understand correctly the rela-
tionship between possible strategies, outcomes and payoffs (e.g., Bosch-Rosa & 
Meissner, 2020; Cason & Plott, 2014; Chou et  al., 2009; Cox & James, 2012; 
Fehr & Huck, 2016; Rydval et al., 2009; Zonca et al., 2020). Studies using choice 
process data (e.g., Brocas et  al., 2014; Devetag et  al., 2016; Hristova & Grin-
berg, 2005; Polonio et al., 2015; Stewart et al., 2016) suggest that when choosing 
a strategy, subjects often pay disproportionally more attention to their own pay-
offs or to specific salient matrix cells, and a non-negligible fraction of subjects 
never look at the opponent’s payoffs, thereby completely disregarding the stra-
tegic nature of the game they are playing. As a result, some part of the observed 
inconsistency might be driven by a failure to incorporate all relevant information, 
or by the use of heuristic rules that correspond to a simplified—and often incor-
rect—version of the actual game in question.
Another possible source of the seeming failure to reason strategically might 
lie in the existence of other-regarding motives (see e.g., Cooper & Kagel, 2016; 
Fehr & Schmidt, 2006; Sobel, 2005 for overviews of the literature). If individu-
als’ strategy choices are not solely driven by self-interest but involve social pref-
erences, it should not be surprising that subjects depart from optimal behaviour 
calculated on the basis of own payoffs only. To date, the role of other-regarding 
motives in normal-form games has been investigated mainly indirectly by moni-
toring the patterns of information acquisition using eye- or mouse-tracking and 
connecting the revealed search patterns to different types of other-regarding pref-
erences (e.g., Costa-Gomes et  al., 2001; Devetag et  al., 2016; Polonio & Cori-
celli, 2019; Polonio et  al., 2015). While evidence from this literature suggests 
that other-regarding motives may interact with the observed levels of strategic 
sophistication, the correspondence between strategy choices and process data in 
establishing causal links is less than perfect, since all the inferences are drawn via 
subjects’ information search patterns. Ideally, what is needed is an explicit meas-
ure of individuals’ other-regarding propensities as related to the payoff structures 
of the games under consideration.
In this paper, we focus primarily on two questions. First, can we increase best 
response rates by encouraging subjects to think more systematically about the 
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subjective values they assign to the payoff pairs and about the weights they attach 
to other players’ possible actions? Second, will allowance for other-regarding 
considerations increase best response rates?
We try to answer these questions by conducting a laboratory experiment in which 
subjects are presented with a set of eight one-shot two-person 3 × 3 normal-form 
games.1 To encourage strategic sophistication, we design a Structured treatment, 
where we prompt players to think about their evaluation of payoff pairs in conjunc-
tion with their beliefs about other players’ possible strategy choices, after which they 
choose their own strategies in the light of those deliberations and with that informa-
tion still in front of them.
Specifically, using a ranking task, we first ask subjects to think about the sub-
jective value they attach to the various cells in each 3 × 3 game. The joint evalua-
tion of payoffs requires subjects to attend more closely to their counterparts’ incen-
tives and motives in general. This increased attention towards others might translate 
into a higher degree of strategic thinking by helping less sophisticated subjects to 
become better at predicting their counterparts’ strategies.2 At the same time, based 
on subjects’ stated rankings, we may infer something about their other-regarding 
considerations, thus relaxing the assumption of pure self-interest (as used by much 
of the literature) in cases where it does not seem appropriate. Some previous stud-
ies (e.g., Bayer & Renou, 2016) have tried to infer subjects’ social preferences from 
their behaviour in a scenario such as a modified dictator game and then ‘import’ 
this information into the games that are their main focus. However, other-regarding 
motives are highly context-dependent and findings from a different decision envi-
ronment might not carry over (see Galizzi and Navarro-Martínez, 2019, for evi-
dence and a meta-analysis). By contrast, our ranking task explores the expression 
of at least some other-regarding preferences in a format intrinsic to the actual games 
under consideration. Thus, the purpose of the joint evaluation of payoffs is two-fold: 
to increase strategic sophistication, while providing some measure of other-regard-
ing preferences.3
Second, using a belief-elicitation task, we ask subjects to quantify the chances 
of each of the opponents’ strategies being played. Importantly, we do not require 
those estimates to conform to any particular assumptions about the rationality of 
reasoning of the other players; we simply ask subjects for their best judgements. 
Previous literature investigating the effect of belief elicitation on equilibrium play 
1 All data and code supporting the findings of the experiment are available from the Open Science 
Framework, accessible at https:// osf. io/ zhufe/.
2 The joint evaluation feature of the ranking task is of particular importance given previous evidence 
suggesting that a non-negligible fraction of subjects neglect their counterpart’s payoffs in strategic envi-
ronments or focus only on a subset of all possible game outcomes (e.g., Devetag et al., 2016; Polonio 
et al, 2015). See also the discussion in Weizsäcker (2003), where adding context to the usually abstract 
matrix representations of normal-form games is suggested as a way to increase attention to others’ incen-
tives.
3 As discussed later, we do not claim that this task will necessarily capture all possible components of 
social preferences. However, to the extent that players take account of other players’ payoffs and the rela-
tivities between their own and others’ payoffs, the ranking task prompts them to weigh up the trade-offs 
involved.
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has obtained mixed results: some studies find that belief elicitation does not affect 
game play (e.g., Costa-Gomes & Weizsäcker, 2008; Ivanov, 2011; Nyarko & Schot-
ter, 2002; Polonio & Coricelli, 2019), whereas others show that whether belief elici-
tation influences game play depends on the properties of the game (e.g., Hoffmann, 
2014; see also Schlag et  al., 2015 and Schotter & Trevino, 2014, for reviews). In 
contrast to these studies, here we investigate the effect of beliefs in conjunction with 
stated rankings over payoffs, rather than the effect of beliefs alone. As such, the 
addition of the ranking task might influence consistency rates as well as game play.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. In line with previous literature 
(e.g., Costa-Gomes & Weizsäcker, 2008; Danz et al., 2012; Hoffmann, 2014; Polo-
nio & Coricelli, 2019; Sutter et al., 2013) we find that a sizeable proportion of play-
ers do not choose equilibrium strategies, and fail to best respond to their own stated 
beliefs. Importantly, while we find that the rate of best response increases signif-
icantly when we allow for other-regarding preferences as revealed by the ranking 
task, the overall magnitude of the difference is relatively small (54% vs. 57%)—
although for the subset of subjects we classify as inequity averse, best response rates 
increase from 54% to 61% when using rankings instead of own payoffs. This finding 
reveals that the observed increase at the aggregate level is almost entirely driven by 
those subjects who are not motivated only by their own earnings. Still, even for this 
subset, a significant share of non-optimal play remains, which is line with evidence 
from some previous studies showing that, in contexts different from ours, other-
regarding preferences alone cannot fully explain deviations from equilibrium behav-
iour (e.g., Andreoni, 1995; Andreoni & Blanchard, 2006; Fischbacher et al., 2009; 
Krawczyk & Le Lec, 2015).
Our results also suggest that the likelihood of choosing non-optimally is decreas-
ing in the costs of doing so. That is, while non-optimal strategy choices are rela-
tively common when the expected payoffs from the different strategies are very sim-
ilar, such choices become less and less likely as the difference in expected payoffs 
between strategies grows, whether measured in terms of foregone monetary pay-
offs or in terms of foregone ranking values. This appears to be compatible with the 
notion of Quantal Response Equilibrium (McKelvey & Palfrey, 1995) or some other 
‘error’ model (see, for instance, Harrison, 1989, for a discussion of the ‘flat maxi-
mum’ critique).
To examine more systematically how far and in what ways our intervention alters 
strategic sophistication, if at all, we compare the patterns of strategy choice in the 
Structured sample with the responses of a different sample drawn from the same 
population who we shall call the Unstructured sample and who were presented with 
exactly the same eight one-shot games but were asked to make their decisions with-
out any prior structured tasks. Since the great majority of game experiments to date 
have been conducted in this unstructured manner, it is of interest to see how the 
patterns of choice might be affected. We find overall no impact of structuring the 
decision process: our attempts to induce ‘harder thinking’ does not affect chosen 
strategies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we describe the design 
and implementation of the experiment. We present our main results in Sect. 3. Sec-
tion 4 discusses and concludes.
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2  The experiment
We chose a set of eight one-shot 3 × 3 normal-form games that were adjusted ver-
sions of the games used in Colman et al. (2014). The games are displayed in Fig. 1.4 
In each cell, the first number indicates the payoff to the BLUE (row) player and the 
second number indicates the payoff to the RED (column) player. All payoffs are in 
UK pounds. The games were chosen because they have no obvious payoff-dominant 
solutions and because they were explicitly designed to differentiate between compet-
ing theoretical explanations (see Table 1). Furthermore, previous evidence from the 
patterns of chosen strategies in these games suggests relatively low-effort thinking, 
which gives us enough room to detect whether structuring responses leads to higher 
levels of strategic reasoning (see Colman et al., 2014; Pulford et al., 2018).
Table 1 summarizes the strategic structure for each game and player role. Besides 
the Nash equilibrium prediction, we consider additionally Level-k models, which 
often out-predict equilibrium play (e.g., Camerer et al., 2004; Costa-Gomes & Craw-
ford, 2006; Ho et al., 1998; Nagel, 1995; Stahl & Wilson, 1994, 1995) to allow for 
bounded depth of reasoning. The Level-1 model assumes that a player best responds 
Fig. 1  Experimental games. Underlined payoffs indicate the Nash equilibria in pure strategies. All pay-
offs are in UK pounds
4 Our games differ from Colman et al. (2014) as follows. We doubled all the original payoffs in order to 
bring earnings more in line with other studies in this literature (relatedly Pulford et al., 2018 multiply all 
payoffs by five and find no evidence of a stake size effect). We also substituted the original Game 8 with 
a new game, because the original Game 8 yielded similar predictions to Game 6.
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to the belief that assigns uniform probabilities to their counterpart’s actions. The 
Level-2 model predicts that a player best responds to the belief that their counterpart 
is playing according to the Level-1 model.
At the beginning of the experiment, subjects were randomly allocated either the 
role of the BLUE (row) or the RED (column) player, and they remained in that role 
throughout the whole experiment. Subjects were then presented with each game in 
turn, proceeding at their own speed. The order in which the eight games were dis-
played was randomized and subjects received no feedback about others’ responses 
until the end of the experiment.
For each game in the Structured treatment, subjects completed three different 
tasks: a ranking, a belief-elicitation and a strategy-choice task.5 The purpose of the 
first two tasks was to structure subjects’ decision-making process and to induce them 
to think about all relevant aspects of a game before choosing their preferred strategy. 
In all tasks, we recorded how much time subjects spent before submitting their deci-
sions. To make each response incentive compatible, one out of the eight games was 
randomly selected for payment, and another random draw directed whether subjects’ 
earnings were determined according to the ranking, the belief-elicitation, or the 
strategy-choice task. We now describe each of those tasks in turn, together with the 
mechanism designed to motivate subjects to give thoughtful and accurate responses.
In the ranking task, subjects were asked to rank all possible unique payoff com-
binations in a particular game from their most preferred to their least preferred one. 
Figure 2 shows a screenshot of the interface of this task as shown to the subjects. At 
the top of the screen, subjects were shown the game being played. In the bottom left 
corner of the screen, they were shown all the possible payoff pairs, ordered as they 
Table 1  Structure of the games and models’ predicted actions
We indicate whether a game has a unique Nash equilibrium or not (Unique Nash), whether another cell 
constitutes a strict Pareto improvement (Nash Pareto dominated), whether it is symmetric or not (Sym-
metric), as well as predictions according to the Nash, Level-1 and Level-2 models. For Game 2 that has 
multiple Nash equilibria we report predictions on the Pareto optimal
Game Unique Nash Nash Pareto 
dominated
Symmetric Nash Level-1 Level-2
1 ✓ ✓ ✘ C–F B–E C–F
2 ✘ ✘ ✘ A–D B–F B–E
3 ✓ ✓ ✓ C–F B–E C–F
4 ✓ ✘ ✘ A–D B–F B–E
5 ✓ ✘ ✘ B–E C–D C–F
6 ✓ ✘ ✘ C–D A–E B–E
7 ✓ ✘ ✘ B–E C–D C–F
8 ✓ ✓ ✘ A–D C–E B–F
5 In the experiment, the different tasks were called Type I, Type II, and Type III decisions respectively 
(see Figures 2–4, as well as the experimental instructions in Online Appendix C).
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appear in the game from top left to bottom right.6 They stated their ranking of these 
pairs by typing in a number between 1 and 9, where 1 corresponded to the pair they 
liked best and 9 indicated their least preferred pair.
In the event that the ranking task was selected for payment, one player in a pair 
of players (either RED or BLUE) was selected as the decision maker. We then ran-
domly picked two of the possible payoff combinations from the selected game and 
paid both players according to the combination that the randomly selected decision 
maker had ranked as more preferable. For example, if the randomly selected player 
was the BLUE player, and the two randomly selected payoff pairs were (8, 6) and 
(10, 4), we looked at which payoff pair the BLUE player ranked higher and paid 
both players accordingly (either £8 for BLUE and £6 for RED, or £10 for BLUE and 
£4 for RED player).
Once subjects had submitted their rankings, they proceeded automatically to the 
belief-elicitation task. In this task, players were asked to think about the ten play-
ers participating in the same session who had been assigned to the role of the other 
colour and they were asked to state their best estimates about how many of these 
ten players would choose each of their three possible strategies available to them.7 
A screenshot of the interface used in the belief-elicitation task is shown in Fig. 3. 
In the event that the belief-elicitation task was selected for payment, we randomly 
picked one of the three strategies available to the other colour of player and then 
compared the subject’s stated belief about the frequency of that strategy choice with 
Fig. 2  Screenshot of the Structured treatment’s ranking task
6 The order of the payoffs from top left to bottom right was per row for the BLUE player and per column 
for the RED player in order to correspond to their actual strategies in the strategy-choice task.
7 All sessions in the Structured treatment were conducted with 20 participants each, 10 BLUE and 10 
RED players.
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the actual frequency among the ten players assigned to that colour in the session. If 
both numbers matched, subjects were paid £5. Otherwise they received no payoff.8
Fig. 3  Screenshot of the Structured treatment’s belief-elicitation task
Fig. 4  Screenshot of the Structured treatment’s strategy-choice task
8 We chose this incentive mechanism instead of the quadratic scoring rule because of its simplicity and 
to avoid distortion due to the possibility of participants reporting beliefs away from extreme probabilities 
(see the discussion in Schlag et al., 2015).
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Finally, on the last screen of each game subjects had to indicate their preferred 
strategy in the strategy-choice task (see Fig. 4 for a screenshot of the interface) on 
the usual understanding that if this task were selected as the basis for payment, they 
would be paired at random with another participant and each member of the pair 
would be paid according to the intersection of their chosen strategies. For instance, 
if the BLUE player chose strategy A, and the RED player strategy D, the BLUE 
player would receive £8 and the RED player £6.
Importantly, in order to reinforce the effect of previous deliberation on the 
selected strategy and to control for differences in working memory capacity (see 
e.g., Devetag et  al., 2016), at the time they were choosing their strategy, subjects 
could see their responses in the ranking and in the belief-elicitation tasks (as shown 
in Fig. 4), making it as easy as we could for them to think strategically in light of 
their previous deliberations, if that is what they wished to do.
In order to measure whether structuring subjects’ decision-making process and 
inducing them to think about all relevant aspects of a game before making their 
decisions had any substantial systematic effect on strategy choice at all, we ran a 
separate Unstructured control treatment. Using the exact same eight one-shot games, 
subjects were simply asked to state—without any prior deliberation tasks—which of 
the three available strategies they wanted to play. In this unstructured environment, 
the sequence of the eight games was repeated twelve times. In the present paper 
we discuss only the data from the first sequence. Since subjects had no information 
about the number of sequences, the repetition could not have affected their strategy 
choices when they saw each game for the first time. To avoid any income effects on 
subjects’ behaviour in the repetitions of the Unstructured treatment, we randomly 
selected for payment a game from any sequence, and not necessarily from the first. 
We then paid subjects according to the intersection of their chosen strategies.9
The experiment was run at the CeDEx laboratory at the University of Nottingham 
using students from a wide range of disciplines recruited through ORSEE (Greiner, 
2015). The experiment was computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). We 
conducted ten sessions (five per treatment) with a total of 194 subjects (100 in the 
Structured treatment, 94 in the Unstructured treatment, 61% of them female, aver-
age age 20.8 years). At the beginning of each session, subjects were informed about 
their role (BLUE or RED) and about the payment procedure that would follow at the 
end of the experiment. Before the experiment started, subjects were asked to read 
some preliminary instructions of an example 3 × 3 game and to demonstrate they 
fully understand the required tasks by answering a series of control questions before 
they could proceed to the actual experiment.
9 The number of repetitions in the Unstructured treatment was determined such that both the Structured 
and Unstructured treatments are of similar duration, so expected hourly earnings do not differ.
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3  Results
We organise our results as follows. In Sect. 3.1, we start with a descriptive analy-
sis of chosen strategies and stated beliefs in the Structured treatment, and discuss 
whether behaviour in this environment exhibits high degree of strategic sophis-
tication, assuming subjects are only interested in maximizing their own payoff. 
In Sect.  3.2, we turn our focus to the ranking task, analysing the extent to which 
subjects are motivated by other-regarding concerns. We then investigate whether 
accounting for such social preferences increases the proportion of optimal strategies. 
In Sect.  3.3, we discuss possible determinants of non-optimal behaviour. Finally, 
in Sect. 3.4 we compare patterns of chosen strategies across the Structured and the 
Unstructured treatments.
3.1  Strategy choices, beliefs and best responses
We start our analysis by focusing on the average proportion of chosen strategies that 
were predicted by the Nash equilibrium together with the Level-1 and Level-2 mod-
els. This is shown in the left side of Table 2 (see the Strategy-choice task columns). 
On average, the proportion of Nash equilibrium strategy choices varies considerably 
across games with a minimum of 0.09 (Game 7) and a maximum of 0.49 (Game 6). 
The average rate of equilibrium strategies in games with a unique Nash equilibrium 
Table 2  Average proportion 
of chosen strategies and stated 
beliefs on models’ predictions
The left side shows the average proportion of strategy choices in 
accordance with the different models’ predictions. The right side 
shows the average probability with which subjects estimated each 
of the different models’ predictions to be chosen by their counter-
part. For Game 2, which has two Nash equilibria, we show the rate 
with which subjects chose the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium, 
and the rate with which they estimate their counterpart will choose 
the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium. Tables A1 and A2 in Online 
Appendix A report these rates separately for the row and column 
players. The total average for the Nash equilibrium is calculated over 
the games with unique equilibrium (excluding Game 2)
Game Strategy-choice task Belief-elicitation task
Nash Level-1 Level-2 Nash Level-1 Level-2
1 0.31 0.53 0.31 0.32 0.46 0.32
2 0.33 0.44 0.46 0.26 0.56 0.38
3 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.26 0.52 0.26
4 0.26 0.28 0.59 0.29 0.43 0.48
5 0.17 0.63 0.50 0.14 0.64 0.40
6 0.49 0.45 0.27 0.51 0.40 0.20
7 0.09 0.62 0.58 0.12 0.63 0.44
8 0.15 0.67 0.18 0.29 0.48 0.22
Average 0.27 0.50 0.41 0.28 0.52 0.34
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(all but Game 2) is equal to 0.27, which is significantly lower than would be pre-
dicted by chance (t test, p = 0.003). Table 2 further reveals that, in line with previ-
ous evidence (e.g., Costa-Gomes & Weizsäcker, 2008; Polonio & Coricelli, 2019), 
the Level-1 and Level-2 models both outperform equilibrium predictions. The 
fractions of chosen strategies consistent with the Level-1 and Level-2 prediction 
amount to 0.50 and 0.41, respectively, on average, compared with 0.27 for the Nash 
equilibrium.
Next, we contrast the patterns of chosen strategies with the average probability 
with which subjects estimated that the counterpart is playing each model’s pre-
dictions. As depicted by the right side of Table  2 (see the Belief-elicitation task 
columns in Table 2), for stated beliefs we observe a similar pattern as for chosen 
strategies: Most subjects do not expect their counterparts to play according to equi-
librium: the average probability with which subjects estimated that their counter-
parts are playing the equilibrium strategy (in games with a unique Nash equilibrium) 
amounts to only 0.28. Instead, following the same pattern as the chosen strategies, 
subjects most often predicted their counterparts would play according to the Level-1 
model (probability = 0.52), followed by the Level-2 model (probability = 0.34).
The fact that most subjects expect that their counterpart will play their Level-1 
strategy, and at the same time, as a response, they also choose their Level-1 strat-
egy, already provides a first indication at the aggregate level that subjects often 
did not best respond. If they were best responding to their own stated beliefs, they 
should have moved one step up in the hierarchy and chosen strategies predicted by 
the Level-2 model. This is not what we observe in our data, since the proportion of 
Level-2 chosen strategies (probability = 0.41) is lower than the proportion of Level-1 
beliefs (probability = 0.52) (see e.g., Polonio & Coricelli, 2019 for similar evidence).
To provide more in-depth evidence on subjects’ best response behaviour, in the 
following, we investigate the level of consistency between chosen strategies and 
stated beliefs at the individual level. To test whether subjects best respond to their 
stated beliefs, we calculate a player’s expected payoff for each possible strategy 
available to them on the basis of those stated beliefs, assuming either linear util-
ity of payoffs, or some degree of risk aversion. More specifically, we use the power 
law function x with  = 1 ,  = 0.8 , and  = 0.5 . We then simply count how often a 
Table 3  Frequency of best 
responses using expected 
payoffs
Game U(x) = x (%) U(x) = x0.8 (%) U(x) = x0.5 (%)
1 45 47 46
2 54 52 55
3 49 51 50
4 53 52 50
5 55 53 51
6 67 64 63
7 68 65 64
8 42 46 54
Average 54 54 54
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subject chooses the strategy that gives them the highest expected utility. The results 
are given in Table 3.
Table 3 reveals that with linear utilities of payoffs (  = 1 ), the average proportion 
of best responses varies from a minimum of 0.42 (Game 8) to a maximum of 0.68 
(Game 7). Averaged over all games, the best response rate is 0.54. Although this is 
significantly higher than predicted by chance (t test, p < 0.001), it means that almost 
half of all strategy choices are non-optimal. Furthermore, the average best response 
rate does not change if we allow for some degree of risk aversion (see last two col-
umns of Table 3). These data are in line with results from previous literature (e.g., 
Costa-Gomes & Weizsäcker, 2008; Polonio & Coricelli, 2019; Rey-Biel, 2009; Sut-
ter et al., 2013), which report consistency levels ranging from 54% to 67%. We add 
to this literature by showing that, despite having their personal rankings of payoff 
pairs and their stated beliefs about their counterparts’ strategies on display at the 
time they are choosing their own strategy, subjects often choose strategies which do 
not maximise the expected utility of their own payoffs.
All in all, these results suggest that our effort to influence subjects’ strategic 
thinking via increased involvement with the game at hand did not translate to either 
a high frequency of choices that are part of a Nash equilibrium strategy or high best 
response rates.
3.2  The role of other‑regarding preferences
A possible explanation for the seeming failure to ‘think like a game theorist’ (Cro-
son, 2000) as described above might be that individuals do not only care about 
their own payoff, but also incorporate the payoffs to others into their utility func-
tion (see e.g., Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Charness & Rabin, 2002; Dufwenberg & 
Table 4  Mean ranking for pairs 
of own and other’s payoffs
Ranking from 1 (most preferred) to 9 (least preferred). Payoff pairs 
that did not appear in any of our games are displayed by ‘–’. In some 
games there were less than nine unique payoff pairs as some pay-
off pairs appeared multiple times. In particular, in games 3, 4, and 5 
there are only eight unique payoff pairs, and in game 7 there are only 
seven. In this case, subjects had to rank each payoff pair only once 
and hence, only ranks between 1 and 8 or 1 to 7, respectively, were 
possible. To correct for this, in Table A3 in Online Appendix A we 
display an alternative version of Table 3 in which we normalize the 
rankings. The results remain effectively unchanged
Other’s payoff
Own payoff 0 2 4 6 8 10
0 8.4 7.3 7.8 7.2 7.5 7.0
2 6.5 5.7 6.5 6.0 6.4 –
4 5.2 5.0 3.8 4.9 6.2 4.9
6 2.9 3.0 3.3 2.1 4.3 –
8 3.1 2.3 3.5 2.4 1.7 –
10 1.9 – 1.7 – – 1.1
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Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk & Fischbacher, 2006; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Rabin, 1993 
for social preference models and Cooper & Kagel, 2016; Fehr & Schmidt, 2006; 
Sobel, 2005 for empirical overviews of the literature). It could be that strategy 
choices which appear non-optimal under the assumption of pure self-interest might 
be fully rational once we allow for subjects’ other-regarding preferences.
To examine this possibility, we turn to the results of the ranking task, in which 
subjects in the Structured treatment were asked to rank the different payoff combi-
nations in each game from most preferred (1) to least preferred (9). Table 4 shows 
the mean ranks for all own-other payoff pairs, averaged over all games.10 Not sur-
prisingly, subjects generally prefer more money over less. That is, holding constant 
the other player’s payoff, the mean ranking score generally decreases as own payoff 
increases. At the same time, we find that the other player’s payoff systematically 
affects subjects’ rankings. In particular, our results reveal that that subjects are, on 
average, inequity averse (e.g., Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). 
That is, in Table 4, holding constant the subject’s own payoff (i.e., fixing a row), 
the most preferred pair lies on the main diagonal (as highlighted by the italicized 
cells) where both players obtain the same positive payoff. The exception occurs in 
the first row where both payoffs are zero: on average, when their own payoff is zero, 
subjects prefer unequal payoffs even though this involves the other player receiving 
more than they do.
These results are further corroborated by OLS regressions, in which we use the 
rank as the dependent variable and own payoff as well as the absolute difference 
between own and other’s payoff as independent variables. The results are reported 
in Table 5. We find that increasing own payoff has a strong and significant nega-
tive effect on stated ranks, consistent with people preferring more money over less. 
At the same time, the absolute difference between their own and their counterpart’s 
Table 5  OLS regression: 
determinants of ranking
This table reports coefficient estimates from an OLS regression. 
Standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in 
parentheses. ***p < 0.01
Dependent variable: Ranking
Own payoff i − 0.652*** (0.010)








# Observations (clusters) 6700 (100)
R2 0.689
10 We find a very high level of ranking-consistency across games. To evaluate consistency, we compare 
the relative ranking of any two own-other payoff pairs that appear in more than one game. For example, 
the payoff pairs (4, 4) and (6, 6) both appear in games 1, 2, and 3, yielding three pairwise comparisons 
of their relative ranking across games. Overall, we find that the relative ranking of pairs of payoffs are 
consistent in 95% of the cases, suggesting that subjects took this task seriously and that they have well-
defined preferences over own and other’s payoffs in the context of our games.
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payoff has a significant positive effect, indicating that, ceteris paribus, people dislike 
inequity.11
To explore whether other-regarding concerns might account for some or many 
of the departures from own-payoff best responses, we re-calculate optimal strategy 
choices based on subjects’ stated beliefs and rankings (rather than payoffs). That is, 
similar to the analysis above, we first calculate the expected ranking for each possi-
ble strategy, assuming linear utilities in rankings. We then simply count how often a 
subject chooses the strategy that gives her the most preferred expected ranking.
The results reveal that best response rates do indeed increase relative to the case 
when only own payoffs are considered. In particular, in 6 out of 8 games the fraction 
of best response rates is higher when using subjects’ rankings rather than their own 
payoffs, with the difference between the two ranging from one to eleven percentage 
points (see the All players column of Table A5 in Online Appendix A). On aver-
age, however, the best response rate increases only moderately from 54% to 57%, 
a difference that is nevertheless statistically significant (Wilcoxon Signed-rank test, 
p = 0.004; paired t test, p = 0.025).12
To shed some further light on the role of other-regarding motives, we explore 
the underlying heterogeneity in social preferences. In particular, while the analysis 
above indicates that subjects are on average inequity averse, previous literature has 
shown that individuals typically differ with regard to their other-regarding concerns 
(see e.g., the discussion in Iriberri & Rey-Biel, 2013). To test for potential hetero-
geneity, as a simple measure of a subject’s social type, we re-estimate the model 
from Table 5 separately for each individual. We then use the sign and the signifi-
cance of the coefficient for the absolute difference between own and other’s payoffs 
to classify subjects into different distributional preference types: Selfish (if a sub-
ject’s ranking is not significantly affected by differences between own and other’s 
payoffs), Inequity Averse (if a subject’s ranking is significantly increasing in payoff 
differences), and Inequity Seeking (if a subject’s ranking is significantly decreasing 
in payoff differences).13
11 We obtain the same qualitative results if we use a rank-ordered logistic regression instead. The results 
are reported in Table A4 in Online Appendix A.
12 For the test we use an individual’s average over all games as the unit of observation.
13 Note that different functional forms of other-regarding preferences are also feasible (see e.g., Charness 
and Rabin (2002) on reciprocity and efficiency concerns, or Engelmann and Strobel (2004) on the role 
of efficiency and maximin preferences). We opt for inequity aversion because of the patterns we observe 
at the aggregate level (compare Table 3) and because it has proven to be a strong factor in explaining 
laboratory behaviour (see e.g., Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Fisman et  al., 2007; Iriberri and Rey-Biel, 
2013 who estimate a preferences-type distribution and find that inequity-averse individuals are the sec-
ond most frequent type after the selfish one or Beranek et al., 2015 who find substantial inequity aversion 
in several samples of students).
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On this basis, 55 out of 100 subjects are classified as Selfish, while 44 subjects 
are classified as Inequity Averse. We find no subject to be Inequity Seeking.14 This 
classification allows us to re-calculate the best response rates separately for each 
type (see the Selfish and Inequity Averse players columns of Table  A5 in Online 
Appendix A). For Selfish individuals we find that, on average, the best response rate 
amounts to 55%, irrespective of whether using expected payoffs or expected rank-
ings (Wilcoxon Signed-rank test, p = 0.372; paired t test, p = 0.766). For individuals 
classified as Inequity Averse, in contrast, we find that including their responses in 
the ranking task significantly increases their level of best response from 54% to 61% 
(Wilcoxon Signed-rank test, p = 0.004; paired t test, p = 0.011). Thus, the observed 
increase in best response rates at the aggregate level when using rankings instead of 
own payoffs is almost entirely driven by those subjects who are not motivated only 
by their own earnings—a reassuring result, as it shows that the ranking task is pick-
ing up something that feeds into subjects’ strategy choices.
In sum, while we find that taking into account individuals’ attitudes to unequal 
payoffs can indeed improve best response rates, the differences are quite small. The 
face value interpretation of our data therefore gives only rather limited support for 
the idea that such preferences are a major explanation for non-optimal behaviour, as 
conventionally judged in terms of maximising expected own-payoff values. How-
ever, some caveats are in order here. In particular, although the ranking task may do 
a good job of tapping into players’ attitudes to inequity, there may be other dimen-
sions of social preferences not captured by this instrument affecting players’ strat-
egy choices. For example, revealed preferences in the ranking task might be context 
dependent: when some pairing of own-other payoffs is being evaluated in the con-
text of where that cell is located in the game matrix, there may be considerations of 
reciprocity or (un)kindness that are absent from the ranking exercise. Similarly, the 
order by which players encounter the ranking and the belief-elicitation task might 
influence their chosen strategies. If the order is reversed, and subjects first consider 
how specific outcomes depend on their counterparts’ intentions, their subsequent 
ranking may be more aligned with the perceived (un)kindness of these outcomes 
in the context of the game. Furthermore, some subjects might be prosocial and can 
reveal this preference in a static scenario, but when the decision becomes strate-
gic, they might believe that their counterparts are selfish, and choose a more selfish 
strategy instead. We cannot exclude these possibilities, and our data do not allow us 
to examine any particular consideration of this kind in a systematic manner. Thus, 
caution should be exercised in extrapolating insights to environments that measure a 
wider range of social preferences besides inequity concerns.
14 One subject falls under neither of these categories as this individual did not significantly react to a 
change in own payoffs. In the following, we discard this subject from our analysis. However, all our 
results are robust to the inclusion of this subject into either of the two categories. To further test the 
robustness of our results, we also applied different classification procedures. In particular, we conducted 
a similar analysis as above, but, following the model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999), allowed for differences 
in the degree of advantageous and disadvantageous inequity aversion. The results are very similar and 
available upon request.
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3.3  Possible factors associated with non‑optimal play
In this section, we try to shed some light on possible determinants of non-optimal 
play other than attitudes to inequity. As a first step, we provide some descriptive 
statistics of the underlying heterogeneity of non-optimal play. At the individual 
level, we find substantial variation in the degree to which subjects best respond. 
While the majority of people (67% when using expected payoffs and 77% when 
using expected rankings) choose optimal strategies in at least half of the games, 
only very few people do so in all eight games (see Figure A1 in Online Appen-
dix A for the full distribution). The mean (median) number of optimal strategy 
choices is 4.33 (4) when using expected payoffs, and 4.59 (4.5) when using 
expected rankings, a difference that is statistically significant (Wilcoxon Signed-
rank test, p = 0.004; paired t test, p = 0.025). This confirms that considering sub-
jects’ attitudes to inequity increases best response behaviour, but that this effect is 
only modest in size.
Next, we look at the cost of non-optimal play. We compare the expected payoff 
(expected ranking) between the chosen strategy and the strategy that would have 
been optimal given a subject’s stated beliefs. Figure 5 shows the percentage of non-
optimal strategy choices as a function of the foregone expected payoff (left panel) 
or foregone expected ranking (right panel). It appears that non-optimal strategies 
are particularly likely when the loss resulting from such choices is small, while they 
become less and less likely the larger the size of the loss. On average, conditional on 
choosing non-optimally, subjects forego £2 of expected payoffs (median £1.8) and 
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Fig. 5  Percentage of non-optimal strategy choices as a function of foregone expected payoffs (left panel) 
and foregone expected rankings (right panel)
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To provide more detail, Table 6 reports results from a series of logistic regres-
sions with choosing optimally as the binary dependent variable. In Model (1), we 
use the standard deviation in the expected earnings across the three available strate-
gies as the explanatory variable. The results show a significant positive coefficient, 
indicating that the more dissimilar the available strategies are (with regard to their 
expected earnings), the higher the likelihood of choosing optimally: intuitively, if 
one strategy stands out as the best, the easier it is to choose optimally. This finding 
is further reflected in response times: the bigger the advantage of the best option, the 
faster subjects reach a decision (see Table A6 in Online Appendix A).
In Model (2), we add the standard deviation of the three possible own earnings 
within the optimal strategy as a second explanatory variable. The coefficient is sig-
nificantly negative, indicating that the higher the variation in own payoffs within the 
strategy that is optimal given the stated beliefs, the less likely subjects are to choose 
optimally. Our finding that strategy variance might act as a determinant of choice is 
in line with previous studies (see e.g., Devetag et al., 2016; Di Guida and Devetag, 
2013) showing that choice behaviour is susceptible to the influence of out-of-equi-
librium features of the games under consideration. Di Guida and Devetag (2013), 
for example, show that increasing the payoff variance in the strategy with the high-
est expected payoff significantly shifts choice behaviour away from that strategy. It 
is not clear, however, from the aforementioned studies, whether this shift reflects a 
tendency to pick a strategy that is both attractive and relatively safe or whether it is 
simply an attempt to avoid the worst possible payoff.
In Model (3), we separate this effect by including two dummy variables indi-
cating whether the optimal strategy contains the lowest or highest possible pay-
off within a given game. The results reveal that containing the minimum possible 
payoff has a strong negative impact on the likelihood of choosing optimally. At the 
same time, containing the maximum possible payoff only has a small positive and 
insignificant effect. It thus seems that the negative effect of variation in own payoffs 
is mainly driven by subjects trying to avoid the worst possible payoff, even if this 
means deviating from the optimal strategy. This result bears some resemblance with 
recent evidence by Avoyan and Schotter (2020), who study allocation of attention 
in experimental games. In line with our results, they find that when presented with 
a pair of games, subjects pay more attention to the game with the greatest mini-
mum payoff, although in their case the game with the largest maximum payoff also 
receives increased attention.
In Models (4) to (6), we repeat the same analysis but now using optimal strategies 
calculated based on subjects’ rankings of payoffs rather than their own payoffs only. 
The results corroborate our previous findings.
3.4  Structuring the decision process has no significant effect on chosen 
strategies
Our analysis so far has looked at behaviour only in the structured environment, 
where subjects were encouraged to invest more effort in thinking about the deci-
sion situation. Our results have revealed that despite our attempt to induce subjects 
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to extensively engage themselves with all relevant elements of the game at hand, 
strategic sophistication (as measured by the fraction of Nash-consistent chosen strat-
egies) as well as best response behaviour was rather low. To test whether structuring 
subjects’ decision-making process has any influence on strategy choices at all, in the 
following we compare the patterns of choice in the Structured treatment with those 
in the Unstructured treatment. The results are reported in Table 7.
Overall, we do not find any evidence that structuring players’ decision processes 
has a significant effect on actual game play. That is, we find no significant differences 
in the rate with which subjects play according to the Nash, Level-1, or Level-2 pre-
dictions across the two treatments. On average, chosen strategies in the Unstructured 
treatment are actually slightly more likely to be consistent with the Nash prediction 
in games with a unique Nash equilibrium (31% vs. 27%) and slightly less likely to 
be consistent with the Level-1 (46% vs. 50%) and Level-2 (38% vs. 41%) prediction, 
but none of these differences is statistically significant (all p values > 0.139).15 These 
results hold if we compare chosen strategies separately for each game and player 
type (BLUE or RED player) (see Tables B1 and B2 in Online Appendix B). In sum, 
in line with the results of Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker (2008) who find no effect of 
belief elicitation on actual game play, we find no strong effect even when we elicit 
payoff rankings in conjunction with beliefs.16
Table 7  Comparison of game play based on different models’ predictions
Average proportion of chosen strategies in accordance with the different models’ predictions in the Struc-
tured (S) and the Unstructured (U) treatment. p values from logistic regressions with robust standard 
errors (clustered at the individual level). For Game 2, which has two Nash equilibria, we show the rate 
with which subjects chose the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium. The total average for the Nash equilib-
rium is calculated over the games with unique equilibrium (excluding Game 2)
Nash Level-1 Level-2
Game S U p value S U p value S U p value
1 0.31 0.33 0.768 0.53 0.51 0.788 0.31 0.33 0.768
2 0.33 0.43 0.172 0.44 0.31 0.061 0.46 0.35 0.125
3 0.42 0.36 0.407 0.42 0.41 0.943 0.42 0.36 0.407
4 0.26 0.34 0.224 0.28 0.32 0.553 0.59 0.54 0.506
5 0.17 0.17 0.997 0.63 0.54 0.218 0.50 0.49 0.883
6 0.49 0.59 0.186 0.45 0.39 0.428 0.27 0.23 0.566
7 0.09 0.16 0.147 0.62 0.56 0.428 0.58 0.60 0.824
8 0.15 0.23 0.140 0.67 0.61 0.358 0.18 0.16 0.706
Average 0.27 0.31 0.139 0.50 0.46 0.162 0.41 0.38 0.348
15 We also do not find any systematic differences when we compare the overall distribution of chosen 
strategies across treatments for either of the players: out of the sixteen possible comparisons between the 
Structured and the Unstructured treatment, only one yields a weakly significant result (RED players in 
game six, p = 0.074). All other comparisons are not significant at the 10%.
16 It has been suggested to us that the lack of difference in subjects’ behaviour across the two treatments 
may have been driven by our incentivizing procedure. In the Structured treatment where we employ a 
single sequence of the eight games using three different tasks, each decision in a game has a probability 
 D. Alempaki et al.
1 3
4  Concluding remarks
Our study sought to examine the extent to which strategic thinking might increase if 
subjects’ possible unfamiliarity with the strategic environment were offset by asking 
them to focus in turn on their ranking of payoff pairs and on their beliefs about the 
other players’ probable choices before selecting their strategies. Although the rank-
ing exercise was not guaranteed to capture all social preferences that might affect 
strategic choice, it was intended to encourage players to pay attention to all of their 
own and the other player’s payoffs, with considerations of the other player’s payoffs 
hopefully leading to more thought being given to the other player’s likely choice 
of strategy. Despite structuring the decision process in this way, a majority of cho-
sen strategies were not consistent with equilibrium behaviour. Furthermore, subjects 
failed to best respond to their own stated beliefs almost half of the time when judged 
in terms of maximising own-payoff expected values. Allowing for different levels 
of risk aversion using a standard utility function form did not help much—although 
avoiding the worst possible payoff did appear to carry some weight. We further 
examined the possible role of subjects’ attitudes to inequity: we found that making 
allowance for such preferences increased best response rates, but only marginally.
We went to considerable lengths, within the usual experimental time and budget 
constraints, to structure the decision process in a way that would facilitate strategic 
thinking. The fact that, despite such assistance, just under half of the chosen strate-
gies were non-optimal might be taken to indicate some intrinsic limit to the preci-
sion with which the expected utilities of options can be judged by players. It might 
be that some degree of variability or noise enters into strategic choice, with the 
result that in some proportion of cases an option other than the best response may 
be chosen. Kahneman et  al. (2016) put this view concisely, when they observed: 
‘Where there is judgment, there is noise—and usually more of it than you think’. 
Thus, some irreducible minimum level of imprecision might generate some propor-
tion of sub-optimal choices. Indeed, the evidence that the likelihood of non-optimal 
responses falls as the opportunity loss increases is consistent with various models of 
noise and stochastic behaviour. Quantal Response Equilibrium is probably the best 
known of these, but others that apply accumulator mechanisms (e.g., Golman et al., 
2020) or preferences for deliberate randomization (e.g. Agranov & Ortoleva, 2017; 
Cerreia-Vioglio et al., 2019; Dwenger et al., 2018) may also be candidates for fur-
ther consideration.
Another possibility might be the failure to fully understand the structure of the 
game and how combinations of strategies produce outcomes (e.g., see Bosch-Rosa 
& Meissner, 2020; Chou et al., 2009 for similar evidence). Even though the purpose 
Footnote 16 (continued)
of 1/24 to be payoff relevant (3 tasks × 8 games). In the Unstructured treatment, each decision in a game 
has a probability of 1/96 to be chosen for payment (12 repetitions × 8 games). Given that subjects were 
not aware of the total number of games in either of the treatments, we think it is unlikely that the lack of 
significant differences in subjects’ chosen strategies is driven by our incentivizing procedure. However, 
we cannot rule out this possibility.
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of the ranking and the belief-elicitation exercise was to provide subjects with a more 
thorough rendering of the strategic environment, the manipulation might not have 
been equally effective for all. A proportion of subjects might have still focused their 
attention solely in the strategy-choice task due to cognitive inability to process the 
insights gained from the pre-decision tasks at the same time (see e.g., Bosch-Rosa 
et al., 2018; Carpenter et al., 2013; Fehr & Huck, 2016 for related evidence on how 
cognitive abilities matter for strategic sophistication). Such cognitive limitations 
might explain the use of heuristic approaches that do not comply with the logic of 
equilibrium behaviour by avoiding for instance the worst possible payoff. Perhaps 
these possibilities are complementary, and non-equilibrium behaviour is simply too 
heterogeneous to be captured by a single explanation. We leave this open for future 
research.
Finally, we want to comment on the lack of any significant difference in the over-
all patterns of chosen strategies between the Structured and Unstructured treatments. 
Our finding may reassure researchers that simply asking participants to pick their 
preferred strategy is an adequate way for experiments to be conducted. Dispensing 
with demanding prior ranking and belief-elicitation procedures does not, on this evi-
dence, greatly affect the quality of the data. Scarce laboratory time and money can 
instead be devoted to collecting larger and more powerful datasets.
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